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Federal Income T ~ X ~ ~ ~ O ~ - I N V E S T M E N T  TAX CREDIT-EXCLUSION 
OF "BUILDINGS" FROM THE INVESTMENT TAX C R E D I T - T ~ ~ ~ U ~  V. 
Commissioner, 508 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1974). 
In 1966 the appellants, Arne and Pauline Thirup, spent ap- 
proximately $80,000 to construct a new greenhouse1 and replace 
the siding and roofing on existing greenhouses. On their 1966 
federal income tax returns, the Thirups claimed an investment 
tax credit under section 38 of the Internal Revenue Code for the 
full amount expended. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
disallowed the investment credit on the ground that the green- 
houses were "buildings" within the  meaning of section 
48(a)(l)(B) and therefore not eligible for the credit. The United 
States Tax Court affirmed the decision of the Commissioner, 
holding that the greenhouses were buildings in appearance and 
f ~ n c t i o n . ~  The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir- 
cuit reversed, holding that the greenhouses did not function as 
buildings and therefore were not excluded from the provisions of 
the investment tax credit. 
Sections 38 and 46-50 of the Internal Revenue Code provide 
for a percentage tax credit on the dollar amount of investment in 
certain depreciable business property having a useful life of three 
years or more. Originally called the "investment tax credit," the 
credit is now officially known as the "job development invest- 
ment   red it."^ The history of the credit has been stormy. First 
enacted by Congress in 1962,4 the credit was suspended from 
October 19665 to March 19678 and was terminated in April 1969.' 
Congress restored the credit as part of the Revenue Act of 1971.8 
- 
1. There was some objection in the Tax Court to the use of the term "greenhouses." 
In addition to consisting of two words, one of which clearly implies a building, the word 
is so broad as to include structures that are substantially different from the appellants'. 
Record at 6-8, Arne Thirup, 59 T.C. 122 (1972), rev'd, 508 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1974). 
However, as was done in the Tax Court and the court of appeals, this case note will, for 
simplicity's sake, refer to these structures as greenhouses. 
2. Arne Thirup, 59 T.C. 122 (1972), reo'd, 508 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1974). 
3. H.R. REP. NO. 92-533, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1971). 
4. Act of Oct. 16, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, $2, 76 Stat. 962. 
5. Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-800, $1, 80 Stat. 1508. 
6. Act of June 13, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-26, 81 Stat. 57. 
7. Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, tit. VII, $703, 83 Stat. 660. 
8. Act of Dec. 10, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, tit. I, $101, 85 Stat. 498. 
CASE NOTES 
A. T h e  Origin of the  "Building" Exception 
One feature of the investment tax credit that has remained 
constant throughout its existence is the exclusion of "a building 
and its structural components" from the provisions of the credit. 
Section 48(a)9 defines the types of property eligible for the invest- 
ment tax credit (known as "section 38 property") as follows: 
a. SECTION 38 PROPERTY .- 
(a) IN GENERAL.-Except as provided in this subsec- 
tion, the term "section 38 property" means- 
(A) tangible personal property, or 
(B) other tangible property (not including a 
building and its structural components) . . . . 10 
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, exercising congres- 
sional authority to promulgate regulations implementing the pro- 
visions of the credit," has defined "building" as follows: 
The term "building" generally means any structure or edifice 
enclosing a space within its walls, and usually covered by a roof, 
the purpose of which is, for example, to provide shelter or hous- 
ing, or to provide working, office, parking, display, or sales 
space. The term includes, for example, structures such as apart- 
ment houses, factory and office buildings, warehouses, barns, 
garages, railway or bus stations, and stores. . . . Such term 
does not include (i) a structure which is essentially an item of 
machinery or equipment, or (ii) a structure which houses prop- 
erty used as an integral part of an activity specified in section 
48(a)(l)(B)(i) if the use of the structure is so closely related to 
the use of such property that the structure clearly can be ex- 
pected to be replaced when the property it initially houses is 
replaced. l2  
9. All references in the text to "section" or "sections," unless otherwise indicated, 
refer to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as amended. 
10. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, $48(a) (emphasis added). Other tangible property quali- 
fies as "section 38 property" only if i t  provides one of the following operations: 
(i) is used as an integral part of manufacturing, production, or extraction 
or of furnishing transportation, communications, electrical energy, gas, water, 
or sewage disposal services, or 
(ii) constitutes a research facility used in connection with any of the activ- 
ities referred to in clause (i), or 
(iii) constitutes a facility used in connection with any of the activities 
referred to in clause (i) for the bulk storage of fungible commodities (including 
commodities in a liquid or gaseous state) . . . . 
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, $48(a)(l)(B). 
11. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, $38(b). 
12. Treas. Reg. $1.48-l(e)(l) (1972). The language from the committee reports is 
similar. 
The term "building" is to be given its commonly accepted meaning, that 
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In spite of the Commissioner's attempt to clarify the meaning of 
"building," the term has been the cause of much litigation and 
confusion. Perhaps the controversy surrounding the meaning of 
"building" is due to the uncertain circumstances under which the 
exception for buildings was born. 
President Kennedy introduced the investment tax credit to 
Congress in a special taxation message in early 1961. He said: 
Specifically, therefore, I recommend enactment of an in- 
vestment tax incentive in the form of a tax credit of- 
Fifteen percent of all new plant [this term includes 
buildings] and equipment investment expenditures in 
excess of current depreciation allowances . . . . 13 
In the same message, Kennedy proposed the elimination of capi- 
tal gains treatment on the sale of essentially all depreciable busi- 
ness property (buildings and equipment). This was to be accom- 
plished through the depreciation recapture provisions of what is 
now section 1245.14 
When the President's tax proposals were sent to the House 
Ways and Means Committee for hearings, they received a cold 
reception. Labor and business both criticized the investment tax 
credit.I5 Real estate interests charged that the application of the 
depreciation recapture provisions to realty would damage the real 
estate busine~s.~Wfter the public hearings were over, Ways and 
Means Committee members met with Treasury officials in 
closed-door hearings to develop an acceptable compromise.17 The 
resulting compromise bill applied the credit only to new invest- 
ment in equipment-buildings were left out.18 It should be noted 
that the committee decided to exclude buildings from the tax 
is, a structure or edifice enclosing a space within its walls, and usually covered 
by a roof. It is the basic structure of an improvement to land the purpose of 
which is, for example, to provide shelter or housing or to provide working, office, 
display, or sales space. The term would include, for example, the basic structure 
used as a factory, office building, warehouse, theater, railway or bus station, 
gymnasium, or clubhouse. 
H.R. REP. NO. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. A18 (1962) (Technical Explanation of the Bill); 
S. REP. NO. 1881, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 154-55 (1962). 
13. Hearings on the President's 1961 Tax Recommendations Before the Comm. on 
Ways and Means, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1961) [hereinafter cited as 1961 Hearings]. 
14. Id. a t  13. 
15. Wall Street Journal, May 5, 1961, a t  2, col. 3; id., May 9, 1961, a t  5, col. 2; id., 
May 16, 1961, a t  2, col. 2; id., May 17, 1961, a t  3, col. 4; id., May 19, 1961, at  12, col. 1. 
16. Id., May 10, 1961, a t  1, col. 5; id., May 16, 1961, a t  2, col. 2. 
17. Id., June 12, 1961, a t  1, col. 6. 
18. Id., July 18, 1961, a t  3, col. 1. 
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credit only after it had announced that buildings would be ex- 
cluded from depreciation recapture. lg 
Although the exact reasons for excluding buildings from the 
tax credit are not known, the following appear to have been major 
factors: (1) many, principally labor and business, opposed the tax 
credit;20 (2) real estate interests strongly opposed depreciation 
recapture as applied to realty;21 (3) the Administration seemed to 
be more concerned with equipment investment than building in- 
vestment;22 and (4) the House Ways and Means Committee was 
concerned about the expected revenue loss from the credit.23 The 
elimination of buildings from both the investment tax credit and 
the depreciation recapture provisions constituted a compromise 
solution. Once the proposals became law, however, confusion sur- 
rounding the building exception emerged. 
B. Judicial Interpretations of "Building" 
In order to determine whether or not a structure is a building, 
the courts have developed a dual test: first, does the structure 
look like a building and, second, does it function as a building?24 
This appearance-functional test derives from the following lan- 
guage in the Treasury regulations: 
The term "building" generally means any structure or edifice 
enclosing a space within its walls, and usually covered by a roof 
[appearance], the purpose of which is, for example, to provide 
shelter or housing, or to provide working, office, parking, dis- 
play, or sales space [function] .25 
The trend in the courts is to stress the function of a structure 
more than the appearance. In applying the functional test, how- 
ever, the courts have not developed a consistent approach; rather, 
they have used varying criteria. 
19. Glasman, Investment Credit-One Year Later, 1964 TUL. TAX INST. 385, 421. 
20. See note 15 supra. 
21. See note 16 supra. President Kennedy specifically intended that the revenue loss 
from the tax credit would be partially offset by the depreciation recapture provisions. 1961 
Hearings 20, 44 (Statement of C. Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury); 3 B.C. IND. 
& COM. L. REV. 232, 239-40 (1962). 
22. See 1961 Hearings 20, 390 (Statement of C. Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the 
Treasury). 
23. Glasman, supra note 19, a t  421. 
24. While most courts do make reference to the physical appearance of a structure, 
i t  is not always clear how the appearance test is used. Most structures litigated under the 
investment tax credit look like buildings; therefore, the courts do not explicitly discuss 
the appearance test. In these cases the courts use that test as a threshold determination 
but focus on the functional test. 
25. Treas. Reg. $1.48-l(e)(l) (1972). 
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Recent court decisions illustrate the application of the 
appearance-functional test. In Robert E. Catron," petitioner 
built a metal Quonset-type structure for the sorting and storage 
of apples. The court held that the one-third of the structure which 
served exclusively as cold storage qualified as section 38 prop- 
e r t ~ . ~ '  In spite of the structure's appearance as a building, the 
court emphasized its function: the lack of employee working 
space determined that the cold storage part did not function as a 
building. In Adolph Coors Co. ,28 two beer cellars and four barley 
receiving stations qualified as section 38 property. The court fol- 
lowed a functional approach and made no mention of the appear- 
ance test. The lack of employee activity taking place in the struc- 
tures, coupled with the fact that the structures were not useful 
for other purposes, was de te rmina t i~e .~~  
In Sunnyside N u r ~ e r i e s , ~ ~  a companion case to Arne Thirup, 
the Tax Court held that the taxpayer's greenhouses were build- 
ings in appearance and function.31 Although this holding was the 
same as that in Arne Thirup, the two cases were factually differ- 
ent in several respects. In contrast to the Thirups' greenhouses, 
the Sunnyside greenhouses had concrete floors and foundations 
and were made of steel frame and aluminum bar construction. 
Also, Sunnyside's employees performed substantially more work 
in the greenhouses than did the Thirups' employees. 
Subsequent to Sunnyside and Thirup, the Tax Court, in 
Melvin S a t r ~ m , ~ ~  held that egg-producing facilities qualified as 
section 38 property. In stressing the functional test, the court 
distinguished the case from Sunnyside and Thirup by noting a 
more limited amount of employee activity in the egg-producing 
facilities. In another recent case also stressing the functional test, 
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. United States,33 the Court of 
Claims held that six whiskey maturation facilities were not build- 
ings for purposes of the credit. The court emphasized three fac- 
tors in coming to this conclusion: (1) the facilities' lack of working 
space; (2) the limited utility of the structures for any other pur- 
26. 50 T.C. 306 (1968). 
27. Id. at 315. 
28. 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1351 (1968), appeal dismissed per stipulation, CCH 1975 
FED. TAX CITATOR ?90,599 (10th Cir. 1969). 
29. Id. at 1362. 
30. 59 T.C. 113 (1972). 
31. Id. at 119. 
32. 62 T.C. 413 (1974), appeal dismissed, 6 P-H 1975 FED. TAXES 761,006 (9th Cir. 
Sept. 29, 1975). 
33. 499 F.2d 1263 (Ct. C1. 1974). 
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pose; and (3) the fact that the working space provided in the 
structures was only incidental to the structures' principal pur- 
pose. The court said that the third factor was the main criterion. 
Prior to the instant case, then, courts used different criteria 
in applying the functional test. While a t  times emphasizing or 
relying on a particular factor, the courts never explicitly rejected 
the validity of any one factor. 
In the instant case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals fol- 
lowed the majority of recent cases by stressing the importance of 
the functional test. In so doing, however, the court rejected out- 
right the appearance test, reasoning that the test is too imprecise 
to achieve the congressional purpose of encouraging improve- 
ments in the quality and quantity of American industrial prod- 
ucts. Referring to Melvin Satrum3* and B r o w n - F ~ r m a n , ~ ~  the 
court stated that "the most recent authorities have adopted the 
functional test" and abandoned the appearance test. The court 
indicated that its purely functional approach eliminates from the 
tax credit the general purpose building that Congress intended to 
eliminate and includes those buildings that are specifically 
adapted for p r o d u c t i ~ n . ~ ~  
In applying the functional test, the court refused to consider 
the amount of employee activity, the primary consideration in 
Melvin Satrum and Brown-Forman, reasoning that the nature of 
employee activity is determinative. If the predominant purpose 
of the structure is to provide working space and shelter for the 
employees, the structure functions as a building; but, in contrast, 
if the structure serves as a productive facility so that the employ- 
ees' activities therein are only supportive or ancillary to the pro- 
ductive purpose of the structure, the structure qualifies for the 
investment credit. In the instant case, the employee working 
space in the greenhouses was only incidental to the purpose of the 
structures which was to provide a total environment to aid in the 
growing of flowers. Employee activities were only supportive of 
that purpose. The greenhouses, therefore, were not buildings and 
were thus eligible for the investment tax credit.37 
34. 62 T.C. 413 (1974). 
35. 499 F.2d 1263 (Ct. C1. 1974). 
36. 508 F.2d at 919. 
37. Id. at 919-20. 
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In the instant case, the Ninth Circuit asserted that a struc- 
ture's function is the sole test of whether the structure is a build- 
ing. The court did not discuss, however, whether its purely func- 
tional approach would apply if the structure in question func- 
tioned as a building but did not have the appearance or physical 
characteristics of one. It is important, therefore, to determine if 
the court was correct in rejecting the appearance test altogether 
and adopting the functional test as the sole criterion. In addition, 
it is appropriate to examine the legislative history of the "build- 
ing" exception to see if the court's approach adequately effec- 
tuates congressional intent. 
A. Rejection of the Appearance Test 
The court justified its rejection of the appearance test on 
three grounds: (1) the congressional purpose "to encourage im- 
provements in the quality and quantity of American industrial 
products" would not be served by using the test; (2) recent deci- 
sions of other courts have rejected the appearance test; and (3) 
recent decisions of the Internal Revenue Service have declined to 
apply the test.38 Analysis of these three grounds, however, demon- 
strates the questionable nature of the court's rationale. 
The court admitted that the appearance test has support in 
the  regulation^^^ and committee reports,40 yet rejected the test as 
"too imprecise" to effect the congressional purpose of encourag- 
ing more and better p r o d u ~ t i o n . ~ ~  Without doubt, the overall 
objective of the credit is to encourage industry to invest in new 
capital improvements. Nevertheless, the "building" restriction 
contained in the statutory scheme is evidence that Congress in- 
tended to encourage investment within definite limits. The 
court's statement of congressional purpose, therefore, is not on 
point, since the relevant inquiry concerning congressional intent 
is not whether the appearance test encourages investment, but 
whether this test helps to effectuate the congressional purpose in 
excluding buildings from the investment tax credit. 
The court cited two recent cases, Brown-For~nan~~ and
Melvin S a t r ~ r n ~ ~  as support for its rejeetion of the appearance 
38. Id. at 918. 
39. See note 25 supra and accompanying text. 
40. See note 12 supra. 
41. 508 F.2d a t  918. 
42. See note 33 supra and accompanying text. 
43. See note 32 supra and accompanying text. 
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test. While the cases point out that the appearance test is not 
always determinative, neither the holdings in the cases nor the 
language of the opinions reject the appearance test as the court 
did in the instant case. The Court of Claims in Brown-Forman 
and the Tax Court in Melvin Satrum determined that the struc- 
tures involved had the physical characteristics of buildings, but 
held that the structures were not buildings because they did not 
function as such. Although the result in these cases would have 
been the same without the appearance test, there is no language 
in either case indicating that the appearance test was rejected. 
The Ninth Circuit also asserted that two revenue rulings44 "de- 
clined . . . to apply the appearance test." Both rulings illustrate, 
however, instances where the appearance test is merely given less 
weight than the functional test; in neither ruling does the Internal 
Revenue Service explicitly reject the appearance test? 
The impropriety of rejecting altogether the appearance test 
and relying exclusively on the functional test is suggested by the 
recent Tax Court case of Joseph Henry Moore46 which involved 
the applicability of the investment tax credit to trailer houses. 
The trailer houses did not qualify for the tax credit under section 
48(a)(l)(B), since they did not provide one of the operations enu- 
merated in tha t  p r o v i ~ i o n . ~ ~  The taxpayer, therefore, tried to 
qualify them as "tangible personal property" under section 
48(a) (l)(A). The government countered that they were buildings 
and thus could not qualify as "tangible personal property." The 
Tax Court responded in these terms: 
The respondent [the Commissioner] urges that since trail- 
ers were used to provide shelter or housing, they are, by virtue 
of their "functional use," no different from a building. Applying 
this "functional use" test, the respondent concludes that the 
trailers should not be treated as tangible personal property for 
purposes of the investment credit. 
The "functional use" test of the regulations (sec. 1.48-l(e)) 
has been applied by the Court in a differing factual con- 
text. . . . But we have never held, and the regulations do not 
suggest, that "functional use" is the sole criterion by which an 
item's status as a building is to be determined. Even the respon- 
44. Rev. Rul. 132, 1968-1 CUM. BULL. 14; Rev. Rul. 359, 1971-2 CUM. BULL. 62. 
45. The Commissioner of the Internal Revenue stated in one 1968 revenue ruling, 
however, that "the definition of the term 'building' for investment credit purposes is 
stated in terms of function rather than physcial appearance." Rev. Rul. 209, 1968-1 CUM. 
BULL. 16. 
46. 58 T.C. 1045 (1972), aff'd, 489 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1973). 
47. See note 10 supra. 
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dent admits that if a trailer is towed from place to place, it 
would "probably" be personal property. Obviously, in that in- 
stance the trailer would also be used for shelter and housing and 
would serve the function of a building. If "functional use" were 
the sole standard by which to judge whether a trailer is a build- 
ing, it should logically be of no importance whether it is towed 
from town to town or towed from place to place in a trailer park. 
It is apparent that before the "functional use" test can properly 
be applied in this case, it must first be shown that the trailers 
were permanent improvements to the land [ i .e . ,  had the physi- 
cal characteristics of a building]. As we indicated above, this 
requirement is fully consistent with the respondent's own regu- 
lations and with congressional intent.48 
Applying both the appearance and the functional test, the court 
held that  the house trailers qualified for the investment tax 
credit. 
While not dealing with the same subparagraph of section 
48(a)(l) involved in the instant case, the Moore decision does 
illustrate the problem that can arise from the exclusive applica- 
tion of the functional test: a structure that functions as a building 
may be excluded from the investment tax credit regardless of its 
physical characteristics. Such would be the result of a mechanical 
application of the Thirup analysis to the facts of the Moore case. 
In light of this possibility, the courts should not reject altogether 
the appearance test, as did the Ninth Circuit. Application of that 
test may be necessary in a future case to properly effectuate the 
congressional purposes underlying the "buildings" exception and 
the investment tax credit. 
B. Adoption and Application of the Functional Test 
The court's exclusive use of the functional test extends the 
current judicial trend of giving the functional test greater weight 
than the appearance test when determining whether a structure 
is a building.49 There is some inconsistency, however, among the 
courts in applying the functional test. I t  is not clear from judicial 
decisions what factors should determine whether a structure 
functions as a building. Among the criteria used by the courts in 
evaluating the function of a structure are: the adaptability of the 
structure to other purposes (the greater the adaptability of a 
structure, the more it functions as a building);50 the amount of 
48. 58 T.C. a t  1052-53. 
49. See notes 26-33 supra and accompanying text. 
50. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. United States, 369 F. Supp. 1283 
(W.D. Ken. 1973), aff'd, 491 F.2d 1258 (6th Cir. 1974); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. 
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employee activity taking place inside the structure (the greater 
the activity that takes place, the more the structure provides 
working space and ~hel ter ) ;~ '  the amount of working space inside 
the structure (the regulations state that one of the purposes of a 
"building" is to provide working space);52 and the nature of em- 
ployee activity (if the employee activity is only incidental to the 
purpose of the structure, then the structure does not primarily 
provide shelter or working space).53 
The court in the instant case took a narrow approach in 
applying the functional test by focusing entirely on one fac- 
tor-the nature of the employees' activities. I t  cited Brown- 
Forman5' and Robert E. CatronJ5 as support for this appr~ach .~ '  
An examination of those cases, however, shows that the courts did 
not focus solely on the nature of employee activity; they also 
scrutinized the amount of that activity. The Ninth Circuit's ap- 
proach seems unnecessarily restrictive in contrast to the flexible 
approaches taken by the other courts. A more reasonable ap- 
proach in light of the court's emphasis on the flexible nature of 
the functional test would be to look a t  several factors, including 
adaptability and amount of working space. 
C. The Court's Use of Congressional Intent 
In rejecting the appearance test, the court indicated that the 
test fails to effectuate the broad purpose of the tax credit?' In 
adopting the functional test, however, the court did not look 
solely to this broad purpose. It also focused on the narrow purpose 
of the provision excluding buildings. The court asserted that the 
functional test excludes from the tax credit the "general purpose 
buildings" that Congress intended to exclude and includes "those 
United States, 499 F.2d 1263 (Ct. C1.1974); Central Citrus Co., 58T.C. 365 (1972); Palmer 
Olson, 39 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1494 (1970); Adolph Coors Co., 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1351 
(1968). 
51. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. United States, 499 F.2d 1263 (Ct. C1.1974); 
Melvin Satrum, 62 T.C. 413 (1974); Sunnyside Nurseries, 59 T.C. 113 (1972); Adolph 
Coors Co., 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1351 (1968). 
52. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. United States, 369 F. Supp. 1283 
(W.D. Ken. 1973); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. United States, 499 F.2d 1263 (Ct. 
C1. 1974); Central Citrus Co., 58 T.C. 365 (1972); Sunnyside Nurseries, 59 T.C. 113 (1972); 
Palmer Olson, 39 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1494 (1970); Robert E. Catron, 50 T.C. 306 (1968). 
53. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. United States, 369 F. Supp. 1283 
(W.D. Ken. 1973); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. United States, 499 F.2d 1263 (Ct. 
C1. 1974); Melvin Satrum, 62 T.C. 413 (1974); Robert E. Catron, 50 T.C. 306 (1968). 
54. 499 F.2d 1263 (Ct. C1. 1974). 
55. 50 T.C. 306 (1968). 
56. 508 F.2d a t  919. 
57. See text acoompanying notes 39-41 supra. 
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specialized structures whose utility is principally and primarily 
a significantly contributive factor in the actual manufacturing or 
production of the product itself."58 As already noted, the court's 
reliance on the broad objective was inappropriate in the context 
of the present case.59 The court's reference to the narrow congres- 
sional objective of excluding buildings from the credit was more 
apposite. The court offered no support, however, for its version 
of the congressional objective or purpose underlying the "build- 
ings" exception.60 
Of the four factors61 that may have influenced the House 
Ways and Means Committee in making the decision to drop 
buildings from the provisions of depreciation recapture and the 
investment tax credit, commentatorsSZ indicate that the precipi- 
tating factor, if not the principal factor, was the pressure from 
real estate interests that opposed depreciation recapture as ap- 
plied to realty. The makeup of this special interest group was 
obviously broad, as is evidenced by the list of parties appearing 
before the House Ways and Means Committee in 1961,63 yet these 
parties had a common goal: maintenance of incentives to buy and 
sell real estate. This goal was manifested by the real estate inter- 
ests' opposition to the depreciation recapture ruled4 The Ways 
and Means Committee, by excluding from depreciation recapture 
(and the investment tax credit) the types of real property com- 
monly bought and sold-land and general purpose 
buildings-satisfied the objectives of these real estate interests? 
58. 508 F.2d at  919. 
59. See text accompanying notes 39-41 supra. 
60. 508 F.2d at  919. 
61. See notes 20-23 supra and accompanying text. 
62. J. EUSTICE, M. FERGUSON & S. ROSS, FEDERAL INCOME TAX LEGISLATION OF 1962- 
1964 IN PERSPECTIVE 38-39 (1965); Glasman, supra note 19, a t  420-21. 
63. The list of real estate interests opposing depreciation recapture includes: Na- 
tional Association of Real Estate Boards, 1961 Hearings 1043; American Hotel Associa- 
tion, 1961 Hearings 1215; National Association of Home Builders, 1961 Hearings 1233; 
National Retail Lumber Dealers Association, 1961 Hearings 1530; and Building and Con- 
struction Trades Council of Greater New York, 1961 Hearings 1549. 
64. There was also some realtor opposition to the investment tax credit. See 1961 
Hearings 1531 (testimony of representative of Associated General Contractors of America, 
Inc.) . However, the real estate groups were principally concerned with depreciation recap- 
ture. See notes 16 & 63 supra. 
65. See J .  EUSTICE, supra note 62, a t  38-39. One witness before the committee recom- 
mended that buildings should be excluded from the investment credit for reasons indepen- 
dent of depreciation recapture: 
Buildings, by contrast [to equipment], are frequently owned by separate corpo- 
rations or syndicates, and are bought, sold, and exchanged for tax advantages 
rather than to secure properties which are inherently more productive from an 
economic standpoint. 
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But the compromise bill not only appeased the real estate inter- 
ests; it also restricted the scope of the tax credit, a proposal 
subject to widespread opposition, and thereby reduced the reve- 
nue loss from the credit. The compromise, however, left the heart 
of the provision-equipment investment-intact. In eliminating 
land and general purpose buildings, Congress left eligible for the 
tax credit special purpose structures which function much as do 
pieces of equipment necessary for a particular production pro- 
cess." With this distinction between "buildings" and productive 
"non-buildings," Congress attempted to effectuate the overall 
purpose of the investment tax credit: stimulation of production 
in the United States. 
The court's decision in the instant case, therefore, is consis- 
tent with the overall purpose of the tax credit and, more impor- 
tantly, the probable motive for the "buildings" exception. The 
Thirups' greenhouses were designed to directly facilitate a partic- 
ular "production" process, to provide a total environment for the 
production of flowers, and were only useful in that process. The 
human activity that took place in the greenhouses was merely 
incidental to the production of flowers. Further, it seems unlikely 
that the greenhouses would be bought and sold as investments, 
since their limited function makes them unattractive for invest- 
ment purposes. As a general rule, real estate investors and build- 
ers are more interested in structures that can be used for various 
Because of the differences in the reasons for sale and exchanges of real 
estate, as compared to machinery and equipment, the denial of the proposed 
investment credit to certain forms of buildings seems a sound one, which should 
be adopted in any basic depreciation reform. 
1961 Hearings 951, 955 (Statement of Dan Throop Smith, Professor of Finance, Harvard 
Graduate School of Business Adminstration). 
66. While working on the reinstatement of the tax credit in 1971, the Senate Commit- 
tee on Finance attempted to clarify the meaning of "building." Although it failed to 
relieve the confusion significantly, the Committee did give the following example of a 
special purpose structure: 
One example of a type of structure closely related to the product it houses 
which was called to the attention of the committee is a unitary system for raising 
hogs which includes automatic feed systems, special airflow units, slatted floor- 
ing, pens and partitions. The structure which can be added to, according to the 
number of hogs raised, is no more than a cover and way of tying together the 
specially designed pens, automatic feed systems, etc. There is no other practical 
use for the structure and it can, therefore, be expected to be used only so long 
as the equipment it houses is used. Such a structure would be eligible for an 
investment credit. 
S. REP. NO. 92-437, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 29-30 (1971). 
As note 10 indicates, there are several other operations besides production which a 
structure can provide and still be eligible for the tax credit. This case note only refers to 
production as that was the purpose of the greenhouses in the instant case. 
848 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1975: 
purposes and thus have wider marketability. In sum, the court's 
distinction between "general purpose" and "special purpose" 
structures accurately reflected the attempted congressional dis- 
tinction between "buildings" and productive "non-buildings" 
and thereby gave effect to the primary purpose of the investment 
tax credit without expanding it beyond its intended scope. 
